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I. INTRODUCTION
This article examines the right to respect for family life in international
law, focusing on its underlying principles and explicit protections. The article
identifies these legal norms so that drafters of international treaties, specifi-
cally the International Migrants Bill of Rights, and United States legal
practitioners representing immigrant children can incorporate the right to
respect for family life into their drafting and advocacy, thereby protecting
and promoting this critical human right.
To encourage both high-level, international treaty-based reform and the
grassroots domestic advocacy necessary to comprehensively protect and
promote this right, this article provides specific ideas for incorporating the
right to respect for family life into (1) the International Migrants Bill of
Rights and (2) the United States immigration advocacy process.
Section II identifies the principles that underlie the right to respect for
family life, especially as it relates to children: (1) that family is the natural
and fundamental unit of society and (2) that maintaining the family unit is in
the best interests of the child. It also discusses the individuals to whom the
right to respect for family life typically attaches. Section III discusses
examples of how courts and U.N. expert bodies, including the European
Court of Human Rights and the United Nations Human Rights Committee,
apply the right to respect for family life in child and family immigration
contexts. Section IV analyzes the themes and reasoning in this case law.
Section V discusses specific ideas for further integrating the right to
respect for family life into the current version of the International Migrants
Bill of Rights. Section VI identifies ways in which United States-based
advocates can incorporate the right to respect for family life into their
* The authors wish to thank Chelsea Friauf-Evans, Georgetown Law J.D. candidate, 2011, for her
research assistance. The authors prepared this article in connection with the April 9, 2010 symposium
on a draft International Migrants Bill of Rights. © 2010, Ryan T. Mrazik and Andrew I. Schoenholtz.
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advocacy efforts. Section VII provides a brief conclusion.
II. UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES AND APPLICABILITY
There are two main principles underlying the right to respect for family
life as it relates to children: (1) the family is the natural and fundamental unit
of society, and (2) maintaining the family unit is in the best interests of the
child.
The first—family is the natural and fundamental unit of society—appears
explicitly in several international conventions.1 The second—maintaining
the family unit is in the best interests of the child—is inferred from the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”) and explicitly stated in the
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (“ACRWC”).2
A. Family is the Natural and Fundamental Unit of Society
There are numerous treaty provisions that explicitly recognize the family
as the natural and fundamental unit of society. These provisions, however, do
not stop there, but also obligate states to afford the family unit broad
protection. For example:
● “The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and
is entitled to protection by society and the state.”3
● “The widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to
the family, which is the natural and fundamental group unit of
society . . . .”4
● “ [T]he family, as the fundamental group of society and the natural
environment for the growth and well-being of all its members and
particularly children, should be afforded the necessary protection and
assistance so that it can fully assume its responsibilities within the
community.”5
● “The family shall be the natural unit and basis of society. It shall be
1. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 16(3), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration of Human Rights].
2. Sonja Starr & Lee Brilmayer, Family Separation as Violation of International Law, 21
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 213, 222 (2003) (citing Convention on the Rights of the Child, Preamble & arts.
7(1), 8(1), and 9(1), Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3); African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of
the Child, arts. 4(1), 19(1), July 11, 1990, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49).
3. Universal Declaration on Human Rights, supra note 1; International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, art. 23(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Convention on the
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, art. 44(1), Dec. 18,
1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 93; American Convention on Human Rights, art. 17(1), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144
U.N.T.S. 146.
4. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, art. 10(1), Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3.
5. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 2, Preamble.
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protected by the State which shall take care of its physical health and
moral.”6
● “The family shall be the natural unit and basis of society. It shall
enjoy the protection and support of the State for its establishment and
development.”7
● “The family as a fundamental unit of society has the right to
appropriate social, legal and economic protection to ensure its full
development.”8
Despite the differences in wording, there seems to be broad international
agreement, including ratification by the United States of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), regarding the principle
that the family is the natural and fundamental unit of society and regarding
states’ obligation to provide this unit some level of protection and support.
B. Maintaining the Family Unit is in the Best Interests of the Child
As stated in the CRC, which is the primary international treaty addressing
the rights of children around the world, and the ACRWC, the “best interests
of the child” standard is the standard by which states must shape their
policies relating to children.9 The “best interests of the child” standard is also
the prevailing legal standard governing court-ordered separation of children
from their families in the United States.10
While determining the “best interest” of any individual child is necessarily
a fact-based, imprecise process, there is legal support for the principle that
maintaining the family unit is in the best interests of a child. The CRC
provisions supporting the inference that the maintenance of the family unit is
in the best interests of the child are:
● Family is “the natural environment for the growth and well-being of
all its members and particularly children,” and that “the child, for the
full and harmonious development of his or her personality, should
grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of happiness,
love, and understanding”;11
● Each child has “the right to know and be cared for by his or her
parents”;12
6. African Charter on Peoples’ and Human Rights, art. 18(1), June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217.
7. African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, supra note 2, art. 18(1).
8. European Social Charter, pt I, art. 16, Oct. 18, 1961, 529 U.N.T.S. 89.
9. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 2, art. 3(1); African Charter on the Rights
and Welfare of the Child, supra note 2, art. 4(1).
10. See LeAnn Larson LaFave, Origins and Evolution of the “Best Interests of the Child
Standard,” 34 S.D. L. REV. 459 (1989).
11. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 2, Preamble.
12. Id. art. 7(1).
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● Each child has “the right . . . to preserve his or her identity
including . . . family relations . . . without interference”;13 and
● A ban on the separation of a child from his or her parents, except by
competent authorities subject to judicial review.14
Although the connection between best interests of the child and maintenance
of the family unit is not explicit, it is easy to infer that the CRC links the two
concepts.15
The link between the maintenance of the family unit and the best interests
of the child also exists, more explicitly than in the CRC, in the ACRWC. In
Article 4(1), the ACRWC identifies the “best interests of the child” standard
as the “primary consideration” for any action involving children.16 It then
continues by providing in Article 19(1) that: “Every child shall be entitled to
the enjoyment of parental care and protection and shall, whenever possible,
have the right to reside with his or her parents.”17 These provisions suggest
that maintaining the family unit is an important component under the
generally and internationally recognized principle of “best interests of the
child.”
C. Protected Individuals
Because one’s family can include parents, siblings, grandparents, adult
children, and others, establishing the existence or non-existence of a family
life involves a fact-based, flexible, and substantive evaluation of situations
where the right to respect for family life might attach.
This inquiry focuses on the strength of the emotional ties between the
people in the situation.18 In some situations, other ties, such as economic
dependence, can also be important.19 Despite this flexible standard, there is
still a hierarchy to the types of relationships that can constitute family life;
certain relationships are more likely to indicate family life than others.
1. Close Family
At its clearest, “family life” exists between a married husband and wife
and between parents and their children.20 The strongest example of family
13. Id. art. 8(1).
14. Id. art. 9(1).
15. Starr & Brilmayer, supra note 2, at 222-23.
16. African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, supra note 2, art. 4(1).
17. Id. art. 19(1).
18. Starr & Brilmayer, supra note 2, at 256 (citing Khan v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 2991/66,
2292/66, 10 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 478 (1967) (Euro. Comm’n on H.R.)); Singh v. Entry Clearance
Officer, New Delhi, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1075 (Eng.), available at http://www.ipsofactoj.com/
international/2005A/Part02/int2005A%2802%29-004.htm [hereinafter Singh].
19. Kugathas v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2003] EWCA (Civ) 31 (Eng.), available at
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2003/31.html [hereinafter Kugathas].
20. X v. Germany, App. No. 6357/73 (1974).
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life, particularly as it relates to children, is that of a child born in wedlock,
who benefits from a strong presumption, which cannot be overturned save
extraordinary circumstances, that he or she has a right to respect for family
life with his or her parents.21 Such a child has a “life bond” with his or her
parents that survives despite contrary occurrences like divorce, separation, or
lack of cohabitation.22
Perhaps most notably, the category of children under the “close family”
rubric also includes illegitimate23 and foster and adopted children.24 Like
children born in wedlock, these children enjoy a similarly strong presump-
tion in favor of family life with their respective parents.
2. Broader Types of Family
Ties between other blood relatives—such as between grandparents and
grandchildren—are likely sufficient, as long as the relatives play a significant
role in the family life.25 This logic might also extend to more distant blood
relatives, such as aunts and uncles, although that particular type of relation-
ship has not yet been explicitly recognized as constituting family life.26
In examining these broader types of family relationships, other types of
ties, such as economic dependence, might come into play.27 For example, in
the case of adult children trying to establish a right to respect for family life
with their surviving parents, something more than emotional ties must
exist.28 The person seeking to establish family life must show that the ties
that bind are more than those of “close relations of whom we are extremely
fond and whom we visit . . . .”29 In such a case, where the emotional
closeness of a “broader family” member is disputed, a demonstration of
economic or other dependence might help establish sufficient ties.
3. Migrant Workers and Their Families
Aside from the protections described above, migrant workers and their
families have an explicit treaty-based reference to the types of individuals
included in their families:
21. See, e.g., Berrehab v. Netherlands, 138 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 22 (1988) [hereinafter
Berrehab].
22. Id.
23. Marckx v. Belgium, App. No. 6833/74, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979) [hereinafter Marckx].
24. Singh, supra note 18; see generally Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to
the Protection and Welfare of Children, with Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption
Nationally and Internationally, G.A. Res. 41/85 (Dec. 3, 1986).
25. Marckx, supra note 23, at 4.
26. See Nsona v. Netherlands, App. No. 23366/94, 32 Eur. H.R. Rep. 9 (2001).
27. Kugathas, supra note 19.
28. See also Khan v. The United Kingdom, App. Nos. 2991/66, 2292/66, 10 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on
H.R. 478 (1967) (Euro. Comm’n on H.R.)).
29. Id.
2010] THE HUMAN RIGHT TO RESPECT FOR FAMILY LIFE 655
“Persons married to migrant workers or having with them a relationship
that, under the applicable law, produces effects equivalent to marriage,
as well as their dependent children and other dependent persons who
are recognized as members of the family by applicable legislation or
applicable bilateral or multilateral agreements between the States
concerned.”30
This International Migrants Bill of Rights incorporates this definition in
Article 18(2). This inclusion is one step toward ensuring that this document
incorporates the right to respect for family life, but is insufficient to promote
and protect this right to the fullest extent possible.
III. RIGHT TO RESPECT FOR FAMILY LIFE: CASES AND THEMES
Claims based upon the right to respect for family life usually arise in two
separate venues pursuant to two different yet related convention provisions.
In each, an individual challenges a state’s adverse immigration action as
contrary to the right to respect for family life.
The first is the European Court of Human Rights (“European Court”)
adjudicating a claim under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights (“ECHR”).31 The European Court’s analysis of Article 8 is well-
developed and extremely useful for thinking about the right to respect for
family life, so much so that the second venue—the UN Human Rights
Committee (“UNHRC”) adjudicating Article 17 of the ICCPR—looks to the
European Court for guidance.32
A. Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights states:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security,
public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals,
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.33
30. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrants Workers and
Members of Their Families, supra note 3, art. 4.
31. See, e.g., Abdulaziz v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 9214/81, 9473/81, 9474/81, 7 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 471 (1985) [hereinafter Abdulaziz].
32. See, e.g., Winata v. Australia, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Commc’n No. 930/2000, P 7.3,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/72/D/930/2000 (2001) [hereinafter Winata]; see, e.g., Madafferi v. Australia,
Commc’n No. 1011/2001, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/81/D/1011/2001, para. 4.16 (2004) [hereinafter
Madafferi].
33. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 8(1) - (2),
Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Convention for Human Rights].
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Article 8 results in a multi-step analysis for the European Court that
involves three different determinations: (1) whether family life exists, (2)
whether the state’s action constituted “interference” with the family life, and
(3) whether despite the interference, the state’s action was justified as in
accordance with law and necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security, public safety, or economic well-being; the prevention of
disorder or crime; or the protection of health, morals, or the rights or
freedoms of others.34 In practice, the third step in this analysis consists of a
balancing test that incorporates numerous relevant factors.
1. Existence of Family Life
First, the court must determine if a family life exists. This analysis follows
the contours described above in Section II.C. Although the European Court
does address this part of the analysis, it often easily finds the existence of a
family life and then moves on to the rest of the analysis.35
2. “Interference” with Family Life
The second aspect of the European Court’s analysis examines whether the
state’s adverse immigration decision constitutes “interference” with the
family life. The question of whether the adverse immigration decision
constitutes interference manifests itself as both a negative and positive
obligation.36 The negative duty imposed upon the state—to refrain from
interference in the family life that already exists in the country—has a
positive corollary—the obligation of a state to admit to its territory certain
family members—that accompanies it.37
There is a difference between these two situations, but those differences do
not usually emerge in this part of the analysis. Rather, the European Court
typically finds an interference with family life, whether through removal or
refusal of entry, and then folds the differences between the two situations into
the fact-specific analysis that follows.38 The type of case—entry or removal—
thus becomes part of the European Court’s balancing of the state’s interest
against the interests of an individual’s right to respect for family life. States
challenge characterization of an immigration decision as interference, but
these challenges are unsuccessful.
More recently, a new type of positive obligation has emerged: the obliga-
tion of a state to care for an unaccompanied non-national child in its
34. Gu¨l v. Switzerland, App. No. 23218/94, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 93, paras. 24-29 (1996)
[hereinafter Gu¨l].
35. See, e.g., Abdulaziz, supra note 31, ¶ 21.
36. Id. ¶ 67.
37. David Feldman, The Developing Scope of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights, 3 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 265, 267 (1997).
38. Gu¨l, supra note 34, ¶ 38.
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territory.39 In that type of situation, the state must also actively facilitate
family reunification between the child and her non-national mother, even
when the mother is living in a foreign country.40 Currently, it is unclear
exactly how far this type of positive obligation might reach but, at least
where unaccompanied minors are concerned, the responsibilities of the
custodial state may be quite significant.
3. Whether the State’s Interference was Justified
Although Article 8 and, occasionally, the court, clearly delineate this third
prong into three separate components (in accordance with law, necessary in a
democratic society, and meeting one of the identified legitimate aims), the
court’s analysis is seldom as clear. Usually, the Court finds that an adverse
immigration decision, as long as permissible under the country’s immigration
laws, was in accordance with law (the petitioner seldom challenges the
legality of the adverse immigration decision). The Court then spends consid-
erably more time balancing a number of factors to weigh the state’s interest
against those of the individual and her family.41
It is during this balancing that the obligation dichotomy discussed above—
the positive obligation to allow entry versus the negative obligation to forego
removal—emerges. Put simply: it is easier to stay in a country with one’s
family than it is to enter another country to be with one’s family.42 That
starting point is a result of well-established international law that gives states
broad discretion in controlling the immigration of non-nationals into their
territory and also provides the basic dividing line for each of the cases
discussed below.43
Recently, as mentioned above, a new type of positive obligation on states
has emerged: the obligation to care for and seek reunification for unaccompa-
nied, non-national minors in its custody.44 This obligation does not fit in the
traditional “entry versus removal” dichotomy and seems to represent a new,
broader application of the Court’s thinking on the reach of Article 8
protections.
Aside from these generalizations, the cases are fact-specific. A brief
discussion of several examples is helpful before identifying their common
general themes and specific arguments.
39. Mayeka v. Belgium (Tabitha Case), App. No. 13178/03 (Sect. 1), Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006)
[hereinafter Mayeka].
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Berrehab, supra note 21, ¶ 25.
42. See Courtney R. Howell, The Right to Respect for Family Life in the European Court of
Human Rights, 34 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 693 (1996).
43. Abdulaziz, supra note 31, ¶ 67.
44. See Mayeka, supra note 39.
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a. Abdulaziz v. United Kingdom (1985)
In Abdulaziz, Mmes. Abdulaziz, Cabales, and Balkandali were lawful and
permanent residents of the United Kingdom (“UK”) who applied for entry
for their respective husbands.45 Pursuant to immigration law at the time, the
UK denied entry to each of the husbands; the three wives then challenged this
decision under Article 8’s right to respect for family life.46
The women argued that Article 8 included the right to establish one’s
family in a country of legal residence. Therefore, putting the women in the
position of having to either be apart from their husbands or move out of the
UK was contrary to Article 8.47 The UK countered that the women had been
granted lawful and permanent status when they were single, and because they
had not shown any obstacles to establishing themselves in their or their
husbands’ home countries, they were actually claiming a right to choose their
residence, which is not protected.48
The Court sided with the UK, finding that several factors weighed in favor
of prohibiting entry: (1) the women had only married after they had achieved
settled status in the UK and, at the time of their marriages, the women knew
that their husbands could have been denied entry, (2) Article 8 does not
protect the right to choose residency, especially where it involves compelling
a state to accept non-nationals for settlement, and (3) there were no real
obstacles to the women and their husbands settling in their home countries.49
b. Berrehab v. the Netherlands (1988)
In Berrehab, a Moroccan citizen, Berrehab, lawfully resided in the
Netherlands when he married a Dutch woman and had a child with her.50
After the marriage, Berrehab applied for and was granted a residence permit
based upon his marriage to a Dutch national.51 Berrehab and his wife
divorced after two years, but he maintained close ties with his Dutch
daughter.52 He applied for renewal of his residence permit but was denied
because he was no longer married to a Dutch national and his relationship
with his daughter could be continued from Morocco.53 Berrehab challenged
this decision pursuant to Article 8.54
After finding the existence of a family life and interference in that family
life through a decision to deport Berrehab, the European Court continued the
45. Id. ¶ 10.
46. Id. ¶ 59.
47. Id. ¶ 66.
48. Id. ¶ 61.
49. Id. ¶ 68.
50. Berrehab, supra note 21, ¶ 7-8.
51. Id. ¶ 8.
52. Id. ¶ 9.
53. Id. ¶ 10.
54. Id. ¶ 11.
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balancing under Article 8(2) and found that the action here was in accordance
with law and that it met a legitimate aim (protection of the labor market), but
that the deportation was not necessary in a democratic society.55
In making its determination, the European Court noted that (1) this was not
a case of an alien seeking first entry, but of a long-time resident who had
lawfully lived, had a home, and worked there; (2) the government had no
additional complaint against Berrehab; and (3) he had a family and, most
importantly, a young child who needed to retain her close ties with her
father.56 Ultimately, the Court sided with Berrehab, holding that the Nether-
lands violated Article 8 because the measures taken were disproportionate to
the need to protect the state’s interest.57
c. Moustaquim v. Belgium (1991)
In Moustaquim, a Moroccan national, Moustaquim, emigrated to Belgium
when he was two years old to join his father.58 He lived there for 19 years and
was then deported.59 While a youth, Moustaquim had engaged in various
criminal activities that eventually served as the basis for his deportation.60
After five years living outside of Belgium, Moustaquim’s deportation order
was temporarily suspended and he was allowed to return because (1) he came
to Belgium at the age of two, (2) all his family was in Belgium, and (3) he
would be given a chance for rehabilitation.61 Despite this temporary permit,
Moustaquim challenged his deportation under Article 8.62
The Court easily found the existence of family life because Moustaquim
had lived in Belgium with his parents and siblings and had kept in contact
with them during his deportation.63 The court also found that the deportation
constituted an interference with that family life.64
In its balancing, the Court found that the deportation was in accordance
with law and pursued a legitimate aim (protection of public order), but that
the factors weighed against it being necessary in a democratic society
because: (1) all criminal offenses were committed when Moustaquim was a
minor, (2) all of his close relatives lived in Belgium, (3) he was less than two
when he arrived, (4) he lived there for 20 years, (5) he only visited Morocco
twice, and (5) he had received all of his schooling in Belgium.65 The
55. Id. ¶ 22-29.
56. Id. ¶ 29.
57. Id.
58. Moustaquim v. Belgium, App. No. 12313/86, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 802, ¶ 9 (1991) [hereinafter
Moustaquim].
59. Id.
60. Id. ¶ 18.
61. Id. ¶ 25.
62. Id. ¶ 36.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. ¶ 45.
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deportation thus impermissibly disrupted his family life.66
d. Gu¨l v. Switzerland (1996)
In Gu¨l, a Turkish national, Gu¨l, lived in Switzerland with his wife.67 Gu¨l
had lived in Turkey for most of his life, but in 1983, he traveled to
Switzerland and applied for political asylum; he left his wife and two sons in
Turkey.68 Gu¨l was denied asylum, but was able to remain in Switzerland after
he was injured at his place of work.69 In 1987, Gu¨l’s wife joined her husband
in Switzerland to seek medical attention and the couple remained there
afterward pursuant to a humanitarian permit based upon Mrs. Gu¨l’s medical
condition.70
After receiving this residence permit, Mr. Gu¨l started proceedings to bring
his son, Ersin, to Switzerland from Turkey.71 After his initial request was
denied, he challenged the denial under Article 8.72 The Court recognized that
Mr. Gu¨l had a family life with his son and that the state’s refusal to allow
Ersin to enter constituted interference with that life.73
In its balancing, the Court found in favor of Switzerland’s right to exclude
Ersin from its territory. In doing so, the Court considered that: (1) Mr. Gu¨l
caused the separation from his son; (2) Mr. and Mrs. Gu¨l had made recent
visits to his son; (3) although Mr. and Mrs. Gu¨l lawfully resided in
Switzerland, they did not have a permanent right of abode; (4) there were no
obstacles to the development of a family life in Turkey; and (5) Ersin had
always lived in Turkey and possessed the cultural and linguistic environment
of that country.74
e. Ahmut v. the Netherlands (1996)
In Ahmut, a Moroccan citizen, Ahmut, had resided in the Netherlands since
1986 and had attained joint citizenship (Morocco and the Netherlands) by
1990.75 When he emigrated to the Netherlands, he left his ex-wife and five
children in Morocco.76 Subsequent to his emigration, his ex-wife died and
her mother then cared for the children.77 In 1990, Mr. Ahmut’s ten-year old
son, Souffiane, arrived in the Netherlands to stay with his father, but he was
66. Id. ¶ 46.
67. Gu¨l, supra note 34, ¶ 6.
68. Id. ¶ 7.
69. Id. ¶ 8.
70. Id. ¶ 8, 11.
71. Id. ¶ 13.
72. Id. ¶ 24.
73. Id. ¶ 37.
74. Id. ¶ 41-42.
75. Ahmut v. the Netherlands, App. No. 21702/93, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 62 , ¶ 7 (1996) [hereinafter
Ahmut].
76. Id. ¶ 9.
77. Id. ¶ 11-12.
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soon denied a residency permit.78 Ahmut challenged the denial under Article
8.
After confirming that a denial of entry can interfere in family life, the
Court balanced the state’s need for immigration control of Souffiane with his
right to respect for family life.79 The Court ultimately upheld the Nether-
lands’ decision, finding that Souffiane could be denied entry because (1)
Souffiane had lived in Morocco his entire life, had strong linguistic and
cultural ties with Morocco, and had family there; (2) Mr. Ahmut had
voluntarily decided to live in the Netherlands; (3) Mr. Ahmut could still
maintain the degree of family life which he himself had opted for; and (4)
there was no obstacle against Mr. Ahmut returning to Morocco, especially as
he had maintained his Moroccan citizenship despite becoming a national of
the Netherlands as well.80
f. Sen v. the Netherlands (2001)
In Sen, two Turkish nationals, Mr. and Mrs. Sen, emigrated to the
Netherlands in 1986, leaving their daughter, Sinem, in Turkey in her aunt’s
custody.81 While living in the Netherlands, the Sens had two more children
that they raised in the Netherlands.82 In 1992, the Sens applied for a residence
permit for Sinem, which was rejected.83 In 1993, an application for review
was also rejected.84 Mr. Sen then filed a complaint under Article 8 alleging
that, by refusing to allow Sinem to enter the Netherlands, the state had
violated his family’s right to respect for family life.
Before the European Court, the Netherlands argued that (1) Sinem had
become more of a part of her aunt’s family in Turkey than of her parents’
family in the Netherlands; (2) the Sens’ decision to voluntarily move to the
Netherlands had weakened their family bond with Sinem; and (3) the
Netherlands had no positive obligation to grant Sinem a residence permit as
long as it was not revoking a permit that already allowed the family to reside
in the Netherlands.85
The Court first acknowledged the factual similarities between this case and
those of Gu¨l and Ahmut: (1) the family’s separation was a result of a
voluntary parental decision to voluntarily leave their country and (2) all of
Sinem’s cultural and linguistic ties were with her home country of Turkey.86
78. Id. ¶ 23.
79. Id. ¶ 60-63, 67.
80. Id. ¶ 69-70.
81. Family and Children: Refusal of Grant of Residence Permit for Daughter of Turkish
Nationals Resident in the Netherlands (Case Comment), E.H.R.L.R. 2002, 4, 537 (2002) [hereinafter
Family and Children].
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 538.
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The Court found that this case differed, however, because of the difficulty of
the Sens’ return to Turkey.87 The Sens had been long settled in the Nether-
lands and had two additional children who had spent their entire lives in the
Netherlands.88 Using those two factors as their decision points, the Court
held that the Netherlands had violated Article 8.
g. Mayeka v. Belgium (Tabitha Case) (2007)
In 2000, Ms. Mayeka arrived in Canada from the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC), was granted refugee status, and received indefinite leave to
remain.89 She then sought to have her five-year old daughter, Tabitha, join
her.90 Ms. Mayeka asked her brother, a Dutch national, to collect Tabitha
from the DRC and look after her until she was able to come to Canada.91
In August 2002, Tabitha arrived with her uncle at the Brussels airport; her
uncle did not have travel or immigration documentation for Tabitha, and she
was refused entry and preparations were made for her removal.92 Tabitha was
detained in Belgium pending removal and separated from her uncle, who
returned to the Netherlands.93 An appointed lawyer unsuccessfully applied
for Tabitha to be granted refugee status.94 During this two-month process,
despite attempts to have her placed in foster care, Belgian authorities held
Tabitha in an adult detention center.95
On October 17, 2002, Tabitha was deported to the DRC.96 A social worker
accompanied her to the airport where she was placed in police custody.97
During her flight, a specially assigned flight attendant looked after Tabitha.98
Upon arrival in the DRC, however, none of Tabitha’s family members were
waiting for her, and Ms. Mayeka did not learn of the deportation until after it
had taken place.99 Eventually, following the intervention of the Belgian and
Canadian prime ministers, Ms. Mayeka and Tabitha were reunited in Canada
on October 23rd.100
Following the incident, Ms. Mayeka alleged that the Belgian authorities’
87. Id.
88. Id. The case comment suggests that Sen was, in part, an attempt to rein in previous deference
to states in cases such as Gu¨l and Ahmut. Id. at 539. Others, however, suggest that Sen is merely a
natural extension of previous cases. See Nicola Rogers, Immigration and the European Convention
on Human Rights: Are New Principles Emerging, E.H.R.L.R. 2003, 1, 53-63. As discussed later, Sen
seems to put a different spin on the Court’s previous cases. For that reason, it seems reasonable that
Sen may have purposefully expanded or altered previous Court holdings.
89. Mayeka, supra note 39, ¶ 9.
90. Id. ¶ 10.
91. Id.
92. Id. ¶ 11.
93. Id. ¶ 13.
94. Id. ¶ 13, 19.
95. Id. ¶ 23.
96. Id. ¶ 31.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. ¶ 34.
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detention of Tabitha, their failure to reunite Tabitha with her in Canada, and
Tabitha’s deportation violated her right to respect for family life.101 Belgium
argued that several factors absolved them of liability: (1) Tabitha’s uncle had
fraudulently tried to pass her off as his daughter, (2) Tabitha had no family in
Belgium, (3) Belgian authorities were unaware of the mother’s attempt to
bring Tabitha to Canada, and (4) Tabitha’s family had been notified of her
arrival in Kinshasa.102
In its decision, the Court took a sympathetic attitude toward Tabitha,
focusing especially on her status as an unaccompanied minor. In balancing
the state’s need to control immigration against Tabitha’s right to respect for
her family life, the Court found that Tabitha’s separation from her caretaker
uncle and detention in Belgium were disproportionate to the state’s inter-
est.103 Additionally, the Court held that Belgian authorities had a positive
obligation to make detailed inquiries to their Canadian counterparts to bring
about the family’s reunification.104 Finally, the Court also held that, since
Tabitha’s deportation delayed her reunification with her mother and left her
without supervision in the DRC, the deportation also violated her Article 8
rights.105
B. Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The second category of cases interpreting the right to respect for family
life come from the UNHRC interpreting Article 17 of the ICCPR. Article 17
provides that: “1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence . . . . 2. Every-
one has the right to the protection of the law against such interfer-
ence . . . .”106 Under this framework, the UNHRC follows an analysis similar
to that of the European Court for interpreting Article 8. After establishing the
existence of family life and a state interference in that family life, the
UNHRC must then determine whether such interference was “arbitrary.”
That inquiry involves a fact-specific, multi-factor balancing test akin to the
test of the Court.
The following cases demonstrate the similarities between the two ap-
proaches. In each case, Australia refused to concede that its immigration
decisions constituted interference in family life even though the arguments
are akin to those made under the European Court’s third-stage balancing
inquiry.107 Due to that similarity, the discussion below examines Australia’s
arguments as part of the balancing inquiry, not as a challenge to the existence
101. Id. ¶ 73.
102. Id. ¶ 74.
103. Id. ¶ 82.
104. Id.
105. Id. ¶ 90.
106. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 3, art. 17.
107. See Winata, supra note 32, ¶ 4.11.
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of interference in family life.
1. Winata v. Australia (2001)
In Winata, Mr. Winata and Ms. Li arrived in Australia in 1985 from
Indonesia on temporary visas.108 After their visas expired, they commenced a
de facto marriage and had a son, Barry, who by virtue of his birth and having
lived in Australia for 10 years was an Australian citizen by 1995.109 In 1998,
when Barry was 13, Mr. Winata and Ms. Li then attempted to obtain a more
permanent and legal status in Australia, but were unable to do so.110
Mr. Winata and Ms. Li appealed to the UNHRC under Article 17, claiming
that any removal from their dependent son would constitute an arbitrary
interference with their family life.111 They recognized that although their
deportation would indeed be lawful, in this case, the age of their son, his
attachment to Australia, his dependence on them as his parents, and their
existence as a family in Australia all weighed in favor of respecting their right
to respect for family life over any immigration decision of the Australian
government.112
The Australian government countered that (1) Barry could leave Australia
and the only disruption to his life would be in his education; his family life
would continue because he would be with his parents; (2) the parents’ failure
to leave Australia when their visas expired and return to Indonesia, where
they had close ties, weighed heavily against them expecting to be able to
remain in Australia; and (3) unlawful establishment of a family in a state’s
territory weighs heavily against invoking the right to respect for family life in
that territory.113
The UNHRC held in favor of Mr. Winata, finding that, although Australia
did have broad discretion in implementing its immigration policy, the
balancing of factors in this case required more than a showing of lawfulness
before they could expel the parents. The determinative factors included that
(1) the parents had been in Australia for 14 years and had a well-settled life;
(2) Barry had been born in Australia, lived there for 13 years, and was a
citizen; and (3) Barry had completed all of his schooling in Australia and had
no real cultural ties to Indonesia.114
2. Madafferi v. Australia (2004)
In Madafferi, Mr. Madafferi arrived in Australia on a tourist visa in 1989.
108. Id. ¶ 2.1.
109. Id. ¶ 2.1
110. Id. ¶ 2.3-2.6.
111. Id. ¶ 3.3.
112. Id. ¶ 3.4-3.5.
113. Id. ¶ 4.10-4.16
114. Id. ¶ 7.3.
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After this visa expired, he became an unlawful resident.115 In 1990, he
married an Australian citizen, with whom he had four children, all of whom
were born in Australia.116 In 1996, Mr. Madafferi applied for a spousal visa
and disclosed past convictions in his home country of Italy; his application
was denied based upon his “bad character.”117 Mr. Madafferi appealed to the
UNHRC based, in part, upon an Article 17 violation.118
Mr. Madafferi argued that his removal would split up his family, resulting
in a violation of their right to respect for family life.119 Australia countered
that (1) any decision about whether the family would stay in Australia or go
to Italy was for the family alone to make (essentially a choice of residence)
and (2) the children were young and could integrate into Italian society.120
After finding the existence of a family life and an interference in that
family life, the UNHRC determined that Australia’s attempt to remove Mr.
Madafferi was arbitrary and therefore violated Article 17. Here, the factors
weighing against removal of Mr. Madafferi included (1) the weakness of the
state’s interest, which was based upon 20-year old convictions in another
country; (2) the 14 years the family had spent together in Australia; and (3)
the lack of linguistic or cultural connection of the children to Italy.121
IV. RIGHT TO RESPECT FOR FAMILY LIFE: THEMES AND REASONING
A. General Themes
In addition to the entry versus removal distinction discussed above, the
case law exhibits several general themes, including (1) the overarching
importance of the child’s cultural and linguistic ties, (2) a sympathetic
attitude toward children, and (3) a high bar faced when showing obstacles to
settlement in one’s home country. These three themes appear in almost all
decisions.
1. Importance of the Child’s Cultural and Linguistic Ties
The importance of the child’s cultural and linguistic ties is pervasive in the
case law:
● In Berrehab, a non-national father’s long-time residence, constant
employment, and personal relationships with nationals in the Nether-
115. Madafferi, supra note 32, ¶ 2.1-2.2.
116. Id. ¶ 2.2.
117. Id. ¶ 2.7.
118. Id. ¶ 2.8, 3.1.
119. Id. ¶ 3.1.
120. Id. ¶ 4.17
121. Id. ¶ 9.8.
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lands, coupled with his daughter’s ties to the Netherlands, allowed
him to avoid removal.122
● In Mostaquim, a non-national adult was allowed re-entry following
deportation because, in part, he had grown up and gone to school in
Belgium.123
● In Gu¨l, a non-national’s son was denied entry to Switzerland in part
because the son had spent his entire life in Turkey and had strong
cultural and linguistic ties to that country and not to Switzerland.124
● In Ahmut, a father’s son was denied entry into the Netherlands in part
because the son had spent his entire life in Morocco, and had strong
linguistic and cultural ties to Morocco, but not to the Netherlands.125
● In Winata, parents who had lived in Australia for 14 years and had a
well-settled life there were able to remain, in part because their child
had been born in Australia, had lived there for 13 years, was an
Australian citizen, and had gone to school only in Australia.126
● In Madafferi, a father who had lived in Australia for 14 years was
allowed to remain in the country, in part because his children, who
were born and raised in Australia, had no cultural or linguistic ties to
Italy, the country to which he was to be deported.127
It is important to note that cultural and linguistic ties can cut in both
directions: either in favor of entry/prevention of removal or against entry/in
favor of removal. Regardless, if this factor works in favor of a particular
individual, it is an important, if not the most important, argument in helping
that family member achieve her objective.
It also seems important to note the analysis in Sen where the court
overlooked the cultural and linguistic ties of the child seeking entry, which
were entirely to the country of Turkey, in favor of preserving the cultural and
linguistic ties of her two younger siblings, which were to the Netherlands.
Although the court’s motivation is unclear, it seems that sheer numbers (one
child with ties to the Turkey, two with ties to the Netherlands) played at least
some role in its decision.
2. Sympathetic Attitude toward Children
The courts regularly display a sympathetic attitude toward children,
particularly where a parent of the child might be deported and thus removed
from the child’s life. In Berrehab, the Court allowed a non-national father to
122. Berrehab, supra note 21, ¶ 29.
123. Mostaquim, supra note 58, ¶ 45.
124. Gu¨l, supra note 34, ¶ 42.
125. Ahmut, supra note 75, ¶ 70.
126. Winata, supra note 32, ¶ 7.3.
127. Madafferi, supra note 32, ¶ 9.8.
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remain, partly because of his young daughter’s need for close contact with
her father.128 In Mostaquim, the court relied on an adult’s youthful ties to
Belgium and youthful indiscretions as part of its justification for allowing his
re-entry.129
This sympathy, however, does not generally extend to situations where a
parent has voluntarily chosen to leave her family for another country and
then later wants to bring those children into their new country of residence. In
Gu¨l, a non-national father could not bring his adolescent son from Turkey
into Switzerland, in part because he had chosen to leave and could also go
back.130 In Ahmut, a father voluntarily chose to leave his children in
Morocco, and as a result, his son was not allowed to join him in the
Netherlands.131
Again, a slight variance to this general theme comes from the Sen case. In
Sen, the parents voluntarily left their first child behind in Turkey, but then
were able to have her admitted to join them six years later in the Nether-
lands.132 In Sen, the court focused heavily on the Sens’ two children who had
been born and raised in the Netherlands; the interests of those two children
outweighed the parents’ voluntary decision to leave their first daughter in
Turkey.
The sympathetic attitude toward children also seems closely tied to the
first overarching theme of the importance of cultural and linguistic ties. In
each of the five cases discussed above, the court, while manifesting a
sympathetic attitude toward children, was also able to rely on the cultural and
linguistic of the children as a justification for its ultimate decision.133
Courts’ sympathetic attitude toward children reached a new pinnacle in
Tabitha when the Court found that Belgium had violated Article 8 because of
the way it treated an unaccompanied minor in its custody.134 The child had no
cultural or linguistic ties to Belgium, did not have any family in Belgium, and
was in Belgium only because her uncle had lied to get her admitted. The
Court held, however, that Belgium’s detention of the child, lack of coordina-
tion with Canadian officials to effectuate family reunification, and deporta-
tion of the child had violated Article 8.
3. High Bar for Adult Applicants Seeking to Establish Obstacles to Return
Finally, courts generally have set a high bar for an adult applicant seeking
128. Berrehab, supra note 21, ¶ 29.
129. Mostaquim, supra note 58, ¶ 44.
130. Gu¨l, supra note 34, ¶ 41-42.
131. Ahmut, supra note 75, ¶ 69-70.
132. Family and Children, supra note 81, at 537.
133. As noted above, Sen put a slight spin on the cultural and linguistic ties theme. Regardless,
the cultural and linguistic ties of children (even if not those seeking entry) played a large role.
134. Immigration and Asylum: Refusal of Asylum Application on Behalf of a Five Year Old—
Refusal of Leave to Enter Belgium (Case Comment), E.H.R.L.R. 2007, 1, 99 at 102.
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to establish obstacles to her return. Courts will not settle for a showing that
return to one’s country of origin would be merely problematic for the adult,
but rather must be convinced that severe obstacles block return to that
country.135
● In Abdulaziz, although the wives had lived in the U.K. for a number
of years, would have to abandon their well-established careers, and
faced being socially outcast, these obstacles did not prevent return.136
● In Ahmut, it was reasonable to expect an adult to abandon his business and
settled life to return to his home country to be with his son.137
● In Gu¨l, despite a difficult medical condition and a well-settled life in
Switzerland, the parents could return home to be with their son.138
However, one set of factors that did meet this standard emerged in Sen, where
the cultural and linguistic ties of two young children, combined with the
well-settled life of the parents, established enough of an obstacle to return to
allow the family to have another one of their children join them.139 This high
bar, then, is not applied in an absolute fashion, but rather takes into account
other significant factors.
B. Tests, Reasoning, and Arguments
Aside from the general themes that characterize most of the judicial
decisions interpreting the right to respect for family life, there are specific
tests, arguments, and reasoning that have emerged. Some of these arguments
and reasoning can be found in almost every case (balancing individual
against state interests) while others have only been mentioned in the dissents
of isolated cases (choosing between settlement and a child is per se
unreasonable).
1. Weighing Individual versus State Interests is the Essential Balancing Test
In the cases above, once the court finds the existence of family life and
interference in that family life, it then proceeds to balance the interests of the
individual in her family life against the interests of the state in controlling
immigration. Courts also frame this balancing test as whether the state’s
actions are disproportionate to the stated need for immigration control.
Under this balancing test, the three general themes described above—
135. Gu¨l, supra note 34, ¶ 41 (suggesting that a showing of persecution leading to asylum might
be sufficient to establish the level of obstacle necessary to prevent return).
136. Abdulaziz, supra note 31, ¶ 68.
137. Ahmut, supra note 75, ¶ 70.
138. Gu¨l, supra note 34.
139. Once again, it is important to note that other motivations—the purposeful reigning in of
decades of deference to individual state immigration authorities—may have been at play in Sen.
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importance of cultural and linguistic ties of the children, a sympathetic
attitude towards children, and a high bar to establishing significant obstacles
to return—frame the inquiry under which additional factors can also play an
important role. None of these factors, however, will be dispositive, especially
where the court focuses instead on one of the three general themes described
above.
There are numerous additional factors on each side of the equation. On the
individual side, the courts will consider (1) a parent’s decision to leave his
home country; (2) the legal status of an individual’s residence in a country;
(3) an individual’s criminal background; (4) an individual’s extent of contact
with her home country; and (5) an individual’s knowledge and/or awareness
of the immigration laws governing his situation.
As a preliminary matter on the state side, there is a strong international
legal presumption in favor of the state’s ability to control entry to its territory
and its immigration framework. Aside from this basic interest, the court will
also consider the need for a state to (1) regulate its economy; (2) protect its
national security; (3) provide public safety; (4) prevent disorder or crime; and
(5) protect the health, morals, or rights or freedoms of others.
2. Adverse Immigration Actions of all Types Interfere with Family Life
In their decisions, courts have reasoned that all types of immigration
decisions—from denial of entry to forced removal to separation from a
caretaker to detention—interfere with the right to respect for family life.
State arguments against this threshold finding have been unsuccessful, as the
courts have easily found interference and instead focused most of their
opinions on balancing individual against community interests. Through their
decisions, the courts seem to imply that debate over whether a state action is
interference is unimportant; the more important inquiry is whether or not that
interference is justified as proportionate to the individual’s interest.
3. Additional Arguments and Reasoning
Aside from the essential balancing test between individual and state
interests and the seeming presumption in favor of finding interference with
family life, there are other arguments that emerge in some of the cases. Most
of these additional arguments and reasoning have only recently emerged as
part of the Sen and Tabitha cases.
● Forcing a parent to choose between remaining settled in one country
and being with their child who lives in another country is per se
unreasonable and/or inhumane.140
140. Immigration: Minor Son of Turkish National Refused Entry—Family Life—Article 8 (Case
Comment), E.H.R.L.R. 1996, 4, 445, 448 (discussing the Gu¨l dissent) [hererinafter Minor Son of
Turkish National Refused Entry].
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● When examining cultural and linguistic ties and the extent to which a
family is well-settled in a particular country, the court can consider
either those of the child seeking entry or of her siblings and family
living in another country.141
● Children are not responsible for their parents’ or relatives’ fraudulent
actions.142
● Unaccompanied minors should be reunited with their families and,
until they are, the custodian state is responsible for their care.143
These arguments and lines of reasoning are more recent than the well-
entrenched general themes discussed above, but the courts’ movement to
adopt them suggests that the right to respect for family life may be broader
than previous cases had identified.
V. FURTHER INTEGRATING THE RIGHT TO RESPECT FOR FAMILY LIFE INTO THE
INTERNATIONAL MIGRANTS BILL OF RIGHTS
In addition to domestic advocacy in the United States, discussed below,
further development of the International Migrants Bill of Rights can help
ensure the protection and promotion of the human right to respect for family
life. As it currently exists, the draft treaty incorporates many references to the
right to respect for family life and has taken excellent first steps to ensuring
recognition of this right for some of the most vulnerable members of our
world. In particular, the IMBR properly recognizes the importance of family
life during the removal and detention process, and highlights the primacy of
this right by designating Article 18 to explicitly address only family rights.
These existing provisions provide a good basis for expansion. Specifically,
we propose the following five revisions to the International Migrants Bill of
Rights.
A. Family is the Natural and Fundamental Unit of Society
Several international conventions already recognize that the family is the
natural and fundamental unit of society, and we recommend that the Bill
incorporate this standard explicitly. Of these existing conventions, almost all
recognize this right within an article dedicated to family life, and we
recommend doing the same by incorporating the following language into the
existing Article 18 of the International Migrants’ Bill of Rights:
Article 18(1) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of
society and is entitled to the widest possible protection and assistance
141. Family and Children, supra note 81.
142. Mayeka, supra note 39, at 84, 89.
143. Id. at 82, 90.
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by the state. Migrant families, irrespective of the citizenship status of
any member of the family, are entitled to the same family protections as
citizens of the state.
This standard should not be controversial as it merely reflects broad interna-
tional agreement as embodied in the U.N. Declaration on Human Rights, the
ICCPR, the American Convention on Human Rights, the ICESCR, the CRC,
the African Charter on Peoples’ and Human Rights, the African Charter on
the Right and Welfare of the Child, and the European Social Charter.144
In addition, drafters of the bill might consider elevating some reference to
the right to respect for family life into the Preamble of the document. Such a
reference would fit well within the existing framework through only a minor
revision:
RECOGNIZING that migrants and migrant families have special needs
that may require special accommodations in certain regards;
Although this adds only three words into the preamble, we believe it can
speak volumes about the importance and relevance of the family-based
considerations in the context of migrant rights.
B. Expand the Best Interest of the Child Standard
In Article 9, the Bill states that the “best interests of the child” shall be a
primary consideration in all actions affecting the child migrant. This inclu-
sion appropriately references the existing internationally-accepted standard
for evaluating state actions affecting children, but revisions could help
transform this principle into a better guide for such actions. We propose:
144. At the April 9, 2010 Symposium on the Draft International Migrants’ Bill of Rights held at
Georgetown Law, the drafters raised a concern about whether the definitions of “family” and
“natural” might exclude non-traditional families. The research did not reveal any example of a state
that has explicitly interpreted these terms in such a discriminatory manner. Human Rights Watch and
Immigration Equality specifically interpret the UDHR and ICCPR language of “natural and
fundamental group unit” as inclusive of LGBT families because there is no express definition of
marriage as between a man and woman. Human Rights Watch & Immigration Equality, Family,
Unvalued: Discrimination, Denial, and the Fate of Binational Same-Sex Couples under U.S. Law 138
(2006).
Furthermore, according to the South African Constitutional Court: “The statement in Article 16(3)
of the UDHR that the family is the natural and fundamental group unit in society, entitled to
protection by the state, has in itself no inherently definitional implications. Thus, it certainly does not
confine itself to the nuclear monogamous family as contemplated by our common law. Nor need it by
its nature be restricted intrinsically, inexorably and forever to heterosexual family units. There is
nothing in the international law instruments to suggest that the family, which is the fundamental unit
of society, must be constituted according to any particular model. Indeed, even if the purpose of the
instruments was expressly to accord protection to a certain type of family formation, this would not
have implied that all other modes of establishing families should for all time lack legal protection.”
Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie; Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v. Minister of Home Affairs,
2005 (CC) at 64 (S. Afr.).
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Article 9(2) The best interests of a child migrant shall be a primary
consideration in all actions affecting the child migrant. Maintaining the
family group unit, the natural and fundamental unit of society, should
be the guiding factor in such considerations, and shall account for the
child’s rights to grow up and live in a family environment, to be raised
by and cared for by his or her parents, and not to be separated from his
or her parents except pursuant to judicial review. The views of the child
migrant, him or herself, must be given due weight in accordance with
the child’s maturity and age.
While a lengthy revision, we believe this text would provide the more
detailed guidance necessary for adjudicators to properly apply the best
interests of the child standard.
C. Incorporate the Fact-Based Inquiries underlying the Existence of
Family Life
International courts have already developed an extensive framework for
considering the existence of a family life and what factors adjudicative
bodies should consider when determining how the right protects families
from state decisions that would interfere with their family life. We propose
the following changes to better incorporate this extensive set of guidelines:
Article 18(2)(a) As with any family, the strength of the emotional or
economic ties between or among people will indicate the existence of a
family life. Among close family members—husbands and wives and
parents and children—family life exists. Among other blood relatives—
grandparents and grandchildren—family life exists where the ties
between or among individuals are significant. This inquiry is fact-
specific and must account for the circumstances of each case.
This incorporation will provide guidance for adjudicative bodies to account
for the different types of family structures and units courts will encounter
when dealing with migrants that come from different cultural and familial
backgrounds than those of the country in which the court sits.
D. Incorporate the “Interference with Family Life” Standard and
Relevant Factors
Currently, Article 5(6) of the Bill discusses the removal process and makes
some limited references to factors courts should consider when granting a
migrant relief from removal from a country to which the migrant has
substantial ties. We would expand this section as follows:
Article 5(6) States shall establish opportunities for relief from removal
for migrants who have a substantial individual connection to the host
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country, for whom removal would interfere with the existence of the
family life of the migrant, or where a condition in the State to which he
or she would be removed prevents removal. These opportunities should
incorporate consideration of the following key factors: (a) the cultural
and linguistic ties of the individual seeking relief, particularly if the
individual is a child; (b) the length of time an individual has spent in a
particular country; and (c) the individual’s personal and economic
connections to the State and citizens of the State.
Making these factors explicit within the Bill incorporates by reference
existing case law and also ensures that the “interference with family life”
standard—the key standard that prompts courts to engage in the fact-specific
balancing inquiry necessary to ensure proper protection of the right to respect
for family life—is explicitly mentioned in the Bill. In the event that drafters
determine that such a lengthy provision is inappropriate in the text of the Bill,
the list of factors to consider could be effective if appearing in the commen-
tary instead. We note that commentary should be developed for Article 5(6).
We also recommend incorporating a specific commentary reference to
support Article 18(4), which states that “Dependent family members of
migrants have a right to derivative immigration status and timely admission
to the country in which a migrant is lawfully settled.” This reference would
note that, under international law, forcing a parent to choose between
remaining settled in one country or being with his or her child who lives in
another country is per se unreasonable or inhumane.145
E. Incorporate the Right to Respect for Family Life throughout the Bill
In addition to these changes, we recommend the explicit incorporation of
the right to respect for family life in all relevant provisions of the Bill,
including within:
● Article 10 as a civil and political right;
● Article 11 as an economic and social right; and
● Article 12 as a cultural right.
These small additions would merely incorporate existing international legal
provisions into respective sections within the Bill to ensure consistent
emphasis of the right to respect for family life throughout the treaty
document.
145. See Minor Son of Turkish National Refused Entry supra note 140.
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VI. INCORPORATING THE RIGHT TO RESPECT FOR FAMILY LIFE INTO DOMESTIC
ADVOCACY IN THE UNITED STATES
There are at least two ways that United States-based advocates might
begin to integrate the themes and arguments identified above into their
domestic advocacy efforts. The first is through challenges—direct and
indirect—to the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard
applicable to cancellations of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(b). The
second is through challenges—direct and indirect—requesting inclusion of
discretion into waiver determinations under Section 212 of the 1996 Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Act (INA).
A. Direct and Indirect Challenges to the “Exceptional and Extremely
Unusual Hardship” Standard For Cancellation of Removal Under 8
U.S.C. § 1229(b)(b).
Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(b)(1)(D), cancellation of removal is
allowed only for those individuals who can demonstrate that:
removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to
the alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States
or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.
Direct and indirect challenges to the “exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship” standard are part of the same argument package. The argument’s
basic structure is:
1. Pursuant to the Charming Betsy canon of statutory construction,
Congress is presumed to have legislated in a manner consistent with
international law.
2. The United States has signed and ratified the ICCPR, which includes
the right to respect for family life in Article 17.
3. The “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard con-
flicts with the United States’ obligations pursuant to ICCPR Article
17.
4. Direct Challenge: the conflict between the “exceptional and ex-
tremely unusual hardship” standard and ICCPR Article 17 cannot be
reconciled without distorting Congress’ statute; therefore, 8 U.S.C.
§1229(b) is illegal under international law.
5. Indirect Challenge: In the alternative, the conflict between the
“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard can be
reconciled by bringing the standard into line with United States’
obligations under Article 17.
The direct challenge highlights the conflict between the two standards and
asks the court to declare the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”
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standard illegal under international law. The indirect challenge presents an
alternative to that more drastic measure and suggests instead that, with some
changes, the court could easily bring the standard into compliance with the
United States’ obligations under ICCPR Article 17.
1. Pursuant to the Charming Betsy Canon of Statutory Construction,
Congress is Presumed to have Legislated Consistent with International Law
The Charming Betsy canon of statutory construction is the starting point of
arguments challenging a domestic statute under international law. The canon
states that, when examining Congressional legislation’s compliance with
international law, there is a presumption that Congress intends to legislate in
a manner consistent with international law.146 The canon thus requires that
courts construe a statute as not conflicting with international law where it is
possible to do so without distorting the statute. Given this starting point,
advocates posing a direct challenge to the “exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship” standard face a high threshold. They must not only show
that the statute conflicts with international law, but also that there is no way
for the court to construe the statute to comply with international law.
2. The United States has Signed and Ratified the ICCPR, which Includes
the Right to Respect for Family Life in Article 17
Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
provides that: “1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence . . . . “2.
Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interfer-
ence . . . .”147 The United States has signed and ratified the ICCPR and is
bound by its provisions.148
3. The “Exceptional and Extremely Unusual Hardship” Standard
Conflicts with the United States’ Obligations Pursuant to ICCPR Article 17
Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(b)(1)(D), cancellation of removal is
146. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 117-18 (1804).
147. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 3, art. 17.
148. How courts should apply ICCPR provisions is a contested issue. Many federal courts do not
apply its provisions once they identify the ICCPR as non-self-executing. In contrast, at least one court
has applied ICCPR provisions as interpretive guidance. Beharry v. Reno, 183 F.Supp.2d 584, 595
(E.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing Beazley, 242 F.3d at 263-68), rev’d on other grounds, 329 F.3d 51 (2d Cir.
2003). Despite the predominant view for the moment, there is a worthwhile argument for the direct
applicability of the ICCPR. In its Executive Transmittal Package for the ICCPR, the Executive
Branch and the Senate adopted a shared understanding about the ICCPR’s status as non-self-
executing. In that view, the ICCPR is non-self-executing not for the usual reason that Congress would
need to take additional actions to implement it, but because existing federal and state law and
regulatory authorities generally met the ICCPR’s obligations so no further implementation was
needed. That prompts the argument that laws that “implement” the ICCPR should be read to coincide
with the United States’ ICCPR obligations. For a full discussion of this important issues, see the
Georgetown memo on the U.S. implementation of the ICCPR.
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allowed only for those individuals who can demonstrate that “removal would
result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse,
parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence.” As currently interpreted by U.S. courts,
the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard sets an extremely
high threshold for individuals seeking cancellation of removal under the
standard. The contours of the standard are most fully explicated in In re
Recinas, the Board of Immigration Appeals precedent decision where the
applicant met the standard’s requirements.
In In re Recinas, a 39-year old native and citizen of Mexico applied for
cancellation of her removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(b). She claimed
that her removal would result in “exceptional and extremely unusual hard-
ship” to her four United States citizen children.149 In examining her claim,
the Board reiterated that the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”
standard requires a threshold showing that the hardship suffered is “substan-
tially beyond that which would ordinarily be expected to result from the
person’s departure.”150 The Board noted it would consider factors such as the
age, health, and circumstances of qualifying family members, and any impact
that a move to another country would have on them.151
To reach that threshold, the mother showed that (1) the four United States
citizen children had been raised in the United States and had known no other
way of life; (2) the children did not read or speak Spanish; (3) the children
were entirely dependent on their mother; (4) the applicant, as a single mother,
did not have any other relatives in Mexico who would be able to assist her
with child care; (5) the children would have lost any economic stake that their
mother had gained in the United States; and (6) all of the applicant’s family
(children and parents) resided lawfully in the United States.152 Only with all
of these factors working in her favor was the mother able to succeed where
previous applicants had failed.
The In re Recinas analysis suggests two reasons why the “exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship” standard conflicts with ICCPR Article 17. First,
Article 17 requires a judicial inquiry into the “arbitrary” nature of any
immigration action; 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b) does not incorporate that inquiry.
Second, to the extent that 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b) does allow an inquiry into the
arbitrariness of an immigration decision, the level of inquiry permissible
under In re Recinas is insufficient to satisfy the legal requirements of ICCPR
Article 17.
149. In re Recinas, 23 I & N Dec. 467 (BIA 2002).
150. Id. at 468 (citing Matter of Monreal, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56 (BIA 2001)).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 471-72.
2010] THE HUMAN RIGHT TO RESPECT FOR FAMILY LIFE 677
a. ICCPR Article 17 requires an additional judicial discretionary inquiry
into the “arbitrary” nature of any immigration action; 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)
does not provide a similar allowance.
The UNHRC’s use of a balancing test stems from the use of the word
“arbitrary” in Article 17 of the ICCPR. The use of the word “arbitrary,” in
addition to the requirement of “lawfulness,” establishes the need for a state to
show not only that its removal action was in accordance with its own
immigration laws, but also that the state interest in removal outweighed the
individual’s interest in remaining. The word “arbitrary” creates an additional
protection for individuals: even where a state has the domestic legal ability to
remove an individual, the state must then, pursuant to Article 17’s “arbitrary”
standard, balance its interests against those of the individual.
There is no corresponding analysis pursuant to the “exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship” standard. United States courts do not meaning-
fully examine the arbitrariness of state’s decision to remove, but only
measure the decision against the statutory standard. That restriction on
judicial analysis results in the checklist-type analysis in In re Recinas,
leaving courts without the ability to incorporate the principle of “arbitrari-
ness” into their decisions.
b. To the extent that 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b) does allow for a determination of
whether or not removal is “arbitrary,” the “exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship” standard does not allow sufficient inquiry to satisfy
international legal requirements.
In re Recinas may give U.S. judges some measure of discretion to inquire
into the arbitrary nature of an immigration decision, but it falls short of the
level required under ICCPR Article 17. In In re Recinas, the Board seemed to
require that every factor weigh in favor of the applicant before it was willing
to grant cancellation of removal. It, in effect, created a checklist under which
an applicant could not receive cancellation of removal. If any factor weighed
against the applicant, it seems unlikely that the applicant would have been
eligible for cancellation of removal.
Although the factors examined in In re Recinas and pursuant to Article
17’s right to respect for family life are similar, the means of weighing those
factors stand in sharp contrast. Recinas’ cumulative analysis is not really a
balancing test at all: it only seems to allow for a cancellation of removal after
the applicant demonstrates that every factor leans in her favor. In contrast, the
UNHRC will find a violation of Article 17 with a simple determination that
the state action was “arbitrary”: that the individual’s interest outweighed that
of the state.
For example, in Winata, the UNHRC found a violation of Article 17 where
the parents had been settled in Australia for 14 years and the child was a
citizen of Australia, had lived there for 13 years, and had completed all of his
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schooling in Australia. The UNHRC determined that these factors simply
outweighed the state’s arguments that both parents were in Australia illegally
and that the family still had close ties to their home country and held that,
pursuant to ICCPR Article 17, both parents were entitled to remain in
Australia with their son.
Under the In re Recinas standard, however, the parents would have failed
on two points of the cumulative checklist: (1) having all members of the
family in the country legally and (2) having no ties to their home country.
Consequently, their situation would presumably not have been “exceptional
and extremely” unusual and they would have been denied cancellation of
removal. This conflict between the decision of the HRC pursuant to ICCPR
Article 17 and the likely decision of the BIA on the same facts pursuant to the
“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard exemplifies the
domestic standard’s inconsistency with international law.
c. Analogy: European Court cases interpreting ECHR Article 8, their
accordance with the UNHRC cases, and their conflict with In re Recinas.
As discussed above, the UNHRC has looked to the European Court’s
interpretation of ECHR Article 8’s right to respect for family life for
guidance in interpreting Article 17. United States-based advocates can argue
that there is a similar conflict between the “exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship” standard and the European Court’s case law interpreting
Article 8.
The European Court, like the UNHRC, also has the ability to exercise
discretion pursuant to the phrase “necessary in a democratic society” in
ECHR Article 8, a term that plays the same analytical role that the word
“arbitrary” plays in the Article 17 analysis. Pursuant to the Article 8
“necessary in a democratic society” phraseology, the Court, aside from any
determination that a particular immigration decision is in accordance with a
country’s domestic law, can conduct a discretionary balancing test of the
state’s interests against the interests of the individual. The additional protec-
tion provided under the word “arbitrary” in the UNHRC jurisprudence is also
provided in the European Court.
Additionally, in the cases above, the Court’s balancing test considers
numerous factors similar to those in In re Recinas, but without In re Recinas’
cumulative requirement. For example, in Sen, a family in the Netherlands
had their right to respect for family life violated when their child was denied
entry to join them. The European Court noted that the family’s long-settled
nature and the presence of other children who had been born in the
Netherlands outweighed the state’s interest in excluding a child, even though
that child had been born in another country, had spent her entire life in that
country, and had extended relatives who cared for her in her home country.
Although an entry case, Sen’s balancing and its contrast with the checklist-
style analysis of In re Recinas is stark. The family who was allowed to have
2010] THE HUMAN RIGHT TO RESPECT FOR FAMILY LIFE 679
their child join them in the Netherlands only met two of the In re Recinas
factors—(1) the family’s long-settled nature in the Netherlands and (2) the
presence of other children who had cultural and linguistic ties to the
Netherlands—yet their child was allowed to enter pursuant to the family’s
Article 8 right. Furthermore, Article 8 required this entry despite the presence
of caretaking relatives in another country and the child’s lack of cultural and
linguistic ties to the Netherlands. Under In re Recinas, the family never
would have been permitted to have their child join them in the Netherlands.
Aside from any other value in the case, Sen also seems to stand most
strongly for the proposition that, under the right to respect for family life, no
factor is determinative. In allowing the child’s entry, the Court set aside
arguably the most important factor—the cultural and linguistic ties of the
child—to allow the child to join her family. Pursuant to In re Recinas, it is
inconceivable that a court could allow a child without any ties to the United
States to enter.
4. Direct Challenge: the Conflict between the “Exceptional and Extremely
Unusual Hardship” Standard and ICCPR Article 17 cannot be Reconciled
without Distorting Congress’Statute; therefore, 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b) is Illegal
A direct challenge to the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”
standard would argue that the conflicts between ICCPR Article 17 and 8
U.S.C. § 1229(b) cannot be reconciled. That is, either due to the lack of a
requirement for an “arbitrary” inquiry or due to the inability of allowing for
the leniency of the international balancing test under the strict cumulative
analysis of In re Recinas, it is impossible to bring 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b) into
compliance with international law. Therefore, the “exceptional and ex-
tremely unusual hardship” standard is illegal. Under the Charming Betsy
canon of statutory construction, a court is likely to try to avoid this
conclusion and attempt, instead, to construe the statute consistent with
international law.
5. Indirect Challenge: The Conflict between the “Exceptional and
Extremely Unusual Hardship” Standard can be Reconciled by Bringing the
Standard into Line with the United States’ Obligations under Article 17
An indirect challenge would argue that, by either construing the statute to
allow for an additional “arbitrary” inquiry or, alternatively, to better reflect an
equitable balancing rather than the In re Recinas cumulative analysis, the
conflict between the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard
and the requirements of ICCPR Article 17 can be reconciled.
This argument does not focus on the determinacy or indeterminacy of any
given factor in any given case, but rather on the need for the court to conduct
a case-specific balancing that equitably weighs the state’s interest against
those of the individual. In re Recinas requires that all factors weigh in favor
of the applicant; the UNHRC and European Court cases allow for harmful
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factors—criminal history, illegal residence, lack of cultural and linguistic
ties—to be outweighed by a stronger showing of an individual interest in
remaining in the country. Each case should be evaluated on its own facts, not
measured against an extremely high statutory standard.
6. Cabrera-Alvarez: Case Study of a Direct Challenge
A version of a direct challenge to the “exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship” standard emerged in the Ninth Circuit in Cabrera-Alvarez v.
Gonzales. In this case, an applicant father challenged an immigration judge’s
denial of cancellation of removal under the standard as contrary to the “best
interest of the child” provisions included in the Convention on the Rights of
the Child.153 The father argued that, to comply with international law, the
impact of his removal on his children had to be the primary consideration in
the cancellation determination.
The Court disagreed with the applicant and determined that the immigra-
tion judge had accounted for the best interests of the child even though he had
ultimately determined that the children’s father was ineligible for cancella-
tion of removal.154 The Court stated that the IJ’s analysis under the “excep-
tional and extremely unusual hardship” standard already incorporated an
examination of the impact of the father’s removal on the children.155
a. Distinguishing Cabrera-Alvarez from the Proposed Challenge
A direct challenge to the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”
standard pursuant to ICCPR Article 17’s right to respect for family life would
mimic the applicant’s position in Cabrera-Alvarez, but with notable differ-
ences. First, advocates would argue from the basis of Article 17 of the
ICCPR, to which the United States is a party. In Cabrera-Alvarez, the Court
had to assume that the Convention on the Rights of the Child was customary
international law for it to apply.156 This assumption likely made the Court
reluctant to grant any additional rights based upon that assumption and put
that applicant at a disadvantage from the outset of his case.
Second, advocates arguing from ICCPR Article 17 have the Winata and
Madafferi cases to demonstrate that the right to respect for family life applies
in the deportation proceedings of parents. The Court in Cabrera-Alvarez was
unconvinced that the applicant’s invocation of the CRC was even appropriate
in a cancellation of removal proceeding.157
Finally, as demonstrated above, there are strong, existing indications of the
differences between the current iteration of the “exceptional and extremely
153. Cabrera-Alvarez v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2005).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1010.
157. See id. at 1010-11.
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unusual hardship” standard as seen in In re Recinas and the current interpre-
tation of ICCPR Article 17 (and ECHR Article 8). United States-based
advocates have textual and judicial support for their direct challenge, and
perhaps more importantly, the alternative of an indirect challenge that offers
the court an easier option for bringing U.S. law into accordance with
international law.
B. Inclusion of Discretion in Waiver Determinations
A second means of incorporating the right to respect for family life into
United States domestic immigration decisions is an ICCPR Article 17-based
argument for the inclusion of agency discretion into waiver determinations
under INA § 212.
Under INA § 212, Congress provided several waivers of inadmissibility,
including those for health-related grounds (212(g)), criminal conduct (212(h)),
fraud or misrepresentation (212(i)), and unlawful presence (212(a)(9)(B)(v)).
Some of these waivers already include processes for the exercise of agency
discretion, but others, like the waivers for criminal conduct, provide for
summary deportation of individuals who facially meet the statutory criteria.
The basic structure of an argument for including a discretion-based
hearing into the § 212 waiver of inadmissibility process is:
1. Pursuant to the Charming Betsy canon of statutory construction,
Congress is presumed to have legislated in a manner consistent with
international law.
2. The United States has signed and ratified the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, which includes the right to respect for
family life in Article 17.
3. The United States’ obligations pursuant to ICCPR Article 17 conflict
with § 212 waiver determinations that do not allow for a manner of
discretion.
4. Direct Challenge: the conflict between the lack of discretion in the
§ 212 waiver process cannot be reconciled without distorting Con-
gress’ statute; therefore, non-discretion-based § 212 waiver determi-
nations are illegal under international law
5. Indirect Challenge: In the alternative, the conflict between the lack
of discretion in the § 212 waiver process can be reconciled by
mandating a discretion-based hearing within the § 212 waiver
process, even where the statute does not require it.
The direct challenge highlights the conflict between the lack of discretion
allowed under some § 212 waiver determinations and emphasizes the
impossibility of bringing that process into line with the United States’
obligations under ICCPR Article 17. The indirect challenge suggests that, by
simply reading a requirement of a discretion-based hearing (or other element)
into the § 212 waiver process, it is possible to avoid a conflict with
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international law.
The first two parts of this argument are the same as discussed in the
corresponding parts in the previous section regarding the “exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship” standard. Now, this memo continues with the
third part of the challenge to the § 212 waiver process.
1. The United States’ Obligations Pursuant to ICCPR Article 17 Conflict
with § 212 Waiver Determinations that do not Allow for a Manner of
Discretion
As part of the right to respect for family life, ICCPR Article 17 prohibits
“arbitrary” interferences into one’s family life. The inclusion of the word
“arbitrary” suggests a need for a measure of discretion in state decisions that
affect an individual’s right to respect for family life. Under the “exceptional
and extremely unusual hardship” standard discussed above, the word “arbi-
trary” in ICCPR Article 17 acts as either an additional protection for
individuals or as an influence on the relative weighing of interests at issue in
a particular case.
The word “arbitrary” should have the same impact on the § 212 waiver
process: Where an individual is facially ineligible for a waiver of inadmissi-
bility and is summarily rejected because of that facial ineligibility, the United
States has breached its obligations under ICCPR Article 17. This breach
stems from the same type of “checklist” process seen in In re Recinas:
Individuals are measured only against a set cumulative standard, with no real
allowance for the fact-specific, case-by-case balancing determinations con-
ducted under ICCPR Article 17.
2. Direct Challenge: The Conflict between the Lack of Discretion in the § 212
Waiver Process cannot be Reconciled without Distorting Congress’Statute;
therefore, Non-discretion-based § 212 Waiver Determinations are Illegal
Under § 212, some of the waivers, such as the § 212(g) health-related
waiver for HIV-infected individuals, already provide a discretion-based
hearing. Others, such as the § 212(h) waiver for criminal conduct, only
require that an individual be measured against the set statutory criteria, and
then have the applicant summarily rejected when he fails to meet that criteria.
Those § 212 waivers that do not provide a discretion-based inquiry on a
fact-specific, case-by-case basis violate ICCPR Article 17 by not allowing for
a determination of arbitrariness before an individual is denied a waiver.
Therefore, those particular § 212 waiver processes are illegal under interna-
tional law.
3. Indirect Challenge: In the Alternative, the Conflict between the Lack of
Discretion in the § 212 Waiver Process can be Reconciled by Requiring a
Discretion-based Hearing within the § 212 Waiver Process
In situations where an individual is facially ineligible for a § 212 waiver
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and thus eligible for summary removal, advocates can argue that the word
“arbitrary” in ICCPR Article 17 requires that an individual to be deported is
entitled to a discretion-based hearing, even if not provided for in Congress’
statute. This indirect challenge seems the most likely to succeed.
In Beharry v. Reno, the Eastern District of New York, facing a challenge to
the § 212 waiver process in part pursuant to ICCPR Article 17, read a
discretion-based hearing requirement in § 212(h) to avoid conflict with
international law. To reach that ultimate conclusion, the Court first found that
that INA § 212(h) was inconsistent with ICCPR Article 17, because an
applicant’s inability to present reasons why he should not be deported
violated the ICCPR’s protection “against arbitrary interference with one’s
family.”158
Despite this broad finding, the Beharry court limited its decision to a
narrow set of cases: those where an alien had lived in the U.S. for the required
seven years and had demonstrated “extreme hardship,” but whose crime was
defined as an aggravated felony only after he had committed it. Aside from
that limitation, however, Beharry can still stand for two points of argument
for advocates working pursuant to ICCPR Article 17’s right to respect for
family life: (1) that ICCPR Article 17’s use of the word “arbitrary” requires
some level of discretion in immigration proceedings and (2) that courts can
use that requirement to read a discretion-based element into immigration
decision-making processes to avoid conflicts with international law.
IV. CONCLUSION
Through the principles and arguments identified and discussed above,
international human rights law on the right to respect for family life provides
a host of possible ideas for the drafters of international treaties and arguments
for child immigration advocates. The underlying principles, broad concep-
tion of the family units, factors that weigh in favor of the family, general
themes, and specific tests, arguments, and reasoning can be developed by
advocates, serve as worthwhile guidance for policymakers, and aid the
drafters of the IMBR in reflecting the current understanding of how the right
to family life applies to international migrants. By promoting this right in
these ways, all these actors can help ensure that its protections will reach
immigrant children around the world.
158. Beharry v. Reno, 183 F.Supp.2d 584, 604 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing Beazley, 242 F.3d at
263-68), rev’d on other grounds, 329 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2003).
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